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Abstract
This paper examines the behavior of a competitive firm that faces joint price and
inflation risk. Given that the price risk is negatively correlated with the inflation
risk in the sense of expectation dependence, we show that the firm optimally
opts for an over-hedge (under-hedge) if the firm’s coefficient of relative risk
aversion is everywhere no greater (no smaller) than unity. We show further that
banning the firm from forward trading may induce the firm to produce more
or less, depending on whether the price risk premium is positive or negative,
respectively. While the price risk premium is unambiguously negative in the
absence of the inflation risk, it is not the case when the inflation risk prevails. In
contrast to the conventional wisdom, forward hedging needs not always promote
production should firms take inflation seriously.
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1The impact of inflation risk on
forward trading and production
This paper examines the behavior of a competitive firm that faces joint price and inflation
risk. Given that the price risk is negatively correlated with the inflation risk in the sense
of expectation dependence, we show that the firm optimally opts for an over-hedge (under-
hedge) if the firm’s coefficient of relative risk aversion is everywhere no greater (no smaller)
than unity. We show further that banning the firm from forward trading may induce the
firm to produce more or less, depending on whether the price risk premium is positive
or negative, respectively. While the price risk premium is unambiguously negative in the
absence of the inflation risk, it is not the case when the inflation risk prevails. In contrast
to the conventional wisdom, forward hedging needs not always promote production should
firms take inflation seriously.
1 Introduction
The importance of risk management has inspired an extensive literature on investment,
production, and consumption under uncertainty. Most of the extant studies have made the
implicit assumption that decision makers care only about their random nominal wealth.
Notable exceptions are Adam-Mu¨ller (2002a, 2002b) and Battermann and Broll (2001),
which examine the production and hedging decisions of the competitive firm a` la Sandmo
(1971) when real wealth matters. In the presence of inflation risk, the celebrated separation
theorem remains intact while the full-hedging theorem no long holds. Adam-Mu¨ller (2002a)
shows further that banning the firm from forward trading may induce the firm to produce
more, not less, a rather striking result that does not arise if there is no inflation risk.
The purpose of this paper is to complement the results of Adam-Mu¨ller (2002). To
characterize the firm’s optimal forward position, we show that the concept of expectation
dependence (Wright, 1987) is useful.1 While Adam-Mu¨ller (2002) specifies the inflation risk
as a monotonically decreasing function of the price risk plus noise, expectation dependence
1For more applications, see Broll et al. (2015), Li (2011), and Wong (2012, 2013).
2provides an alternative bivariate dependence structure. Given that the price risk is neg-
atively correlated with the inflation risk in the sense of expectation dependence, we show
that the firm optimally opts for an over-hedge (under-hedge) should the firm’s coefficient of
relative risk aversion be everywhere no greater (no smaller) than unity, which is consistent
with the results of Adam-Mu¨ller (2002). We show further that the firm optimally produces
more or less in the absence than in the presence of forward hedging, depending on whether
the price risk premium is positive or negative, respectively. In the absence of the inflation
risk, the price risk premium is always negative, thereby rendering the adverse effect on
output when forward trading is not allowed (see, for example, Holthausen 1979). When the
inflation risk prevails, the price risk premium can be positive so that forward trading may
not promote production, a stark contrast to the conventional wisdom.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates the model of the
competitive firm under joint price and inflation risk. Section 3 introduces the concept
of expectation dependence. Section 4 characterizes the firm’s optimal forward position.
Section 5 examines the firm’s optimal production decision. The final section concludes.
2 The model
Consider a competitive firm that operates for one period with two dates, 0 and 1. To begin,
the firm acquires inputs at known nominal prices to produce a single commodity. The
nominal value of inputs at date 1 gives rise to a deterministic cost function, C(Q), where
Q ≥ 0 is the output level chosen by the firm at date 0, C(0) = C′(0) = 0, and C′(Q) > 0
and C′′(Q) > 0 for all Q > 0.2
At date 1, the firm sells its entire output, Q, at the uncertain nominal output price,
P˜ .3 We model inflation risk by a stochastic purchasing power index, Z˜ , with unit mean so
2The strict convexity of C(Q) is driven by the firm’s production technology that exhibits decreasing
returns to scale.
3Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
3that Z˜ − 1 gauges surprises due to purchasing power changes. Let F (P ) be the marginal
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of P˜ over support [P, P ] with 0 < P < P . Likewise,
let G(Z) be the marginal CDF of Z˜ over support [Z, Z] with 0 < Z < Z. To allow the price
risk, P˜ , to be correlated with the inflation risk, Z˜, we denote H(P, Z) as their joint CDF
over support [P, P ]× [Z, Z].
While the inflation risk, Z˜, is neither hedgeable nor insurable, the firm can hedge against
the price risk, P˜ , by selling (purchasing if negative) X units of its output forward at the
known forward price, P f , at date 0. The firm’s real income at date 1 is, therefore, given by
Π˜ = Z˜[W + P˜Q+ (P f − P˜ )X −C(Q)], (1)
where W > 0 is a fixed component of nominal income. We say that the firm’s forward
position, X , is an under-hedge, a full-hedge, or an over-hedge, depending on whether X is
smaller than, equal to, or greater than the output level, Q, respectively.
The firm is risk averse and possesses a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, U(Π),
defined over its real income at date 1, Π, with U ′(Π) > 0 and U ′′(Π) < 0 for all Π > 0. The
firm’s ex-ante decision problem at date 0 is to choose its output level, Q, and its forward
position, X , so as to maximize the expected utility of its real income at date 1:
max
Q≥0,X
E[U(Π˜)], (2)
where E(·) is the expectation operator with respect to H(P, Z), and Π˜ is given by Eq. (1).
The first-order conditions for program (2) are given by
E{U ′(Π˜∗)Z˜[P˜ −C′(Q∗)]} = 0, (3)
and
E[U ′(Π˜∗)Z˜(P f − P˜ )] = 0, (4)
where an asterisk (∗) signifies an optimal level. The second-order conditions for program
(2) are satisfied given that U ′′(Π) < 0 and C′′(Q) > 0. We restrict our attention to the case
that the forward price is unbiased, i.e., P f = E(P˜ ).
43 Expectation dependence
We define the CDF of P˜ conditional on the event that Z˜ ≤ Z as
F (P |Z˜ ≤ Z) =
H(P, Z)
G(Z)
, (5)
over support [P, P ] for all Z ∈ [Z, Z]. Let E(P˜ |Z˜ ≤ Z) be the expected value of P˜ with
respect to the conditional CDF, F (P |Z˜ ≤ Z). The following bivariate dependence structure,
known as expectation dependence, is due to Wright (1987).
Definition 1 The price risk, P˜ , is said to be negatively (positively) expectation dependent
on the inflation risk, Z˜, if
ED(P˜ |Z) = E(P˜ )− E(P˜ |Z˜ ≤ Z) ≤ (≥) 0, (6)
for all Z ∈ [Z, Z], where the inequality is strict for some non-degenerate intervals.
Eq. (6) implies that the expected value of the price risk, P˜ , is revised downward (up-
ward) whenever the inflation risk, Z˜, is discovered to be small, in the precise sense that the
truncation, Z˜ ≤ Z, is presented. To see further how Definition 1 defines dependence, we
write Eq. (6) as
ED(P˜ |Z) =
∫ P
P
P dF (P )−
∫ P
P
P dF (P |Z˜ ≤ Z)
=
∫ P
P
[F (P |Z˜ ≤ Z)− F (P )] dP, (7)
where the second equality follows from integration by parts. It is evident from Eq. (8)
that ED(P˜ |Z) ≤ (≥) 0 if F (P |Z˜ ≤ Z) ≤ (≥) F (P ) for all P ∈ [P, P ], i.e., if F (P |Z˜ ≤ Z)
dominates (is dominated by) F (P ) in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Hence,
negative (positive) expectation dependence is implied by the fact that small inflation risk
decreases (increases) the price risk in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, which
can be verified empirically using tests of stochastic dominance. Wright (1987) shows that
5negative (positive) expectation dependence is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for
negative (positive) correlation.
Adam-Mu¨ller (2002) specifies the inflation risk as Z˜ = b(P˜ ) + ˜, where b(P ) is a deter-
ministic function with b′(P ) < 0, and ˜ is a zero-mean random variable such that the price
risk, P˜ , is conditionally independent of ˜, i.e., E(P˜ |) = E(P˜ ) for all . An alternative spec-
ification along the lines of Adam-Mu¨ller (2002) is to model the price risk as P˜ = B(Z˜) + η˜,
where B(Z) is a deterministic function with B′(Z) < 0, and η˜ is a zero-mean random vari-
able such that the inflation risk, Z˜, is conditionally independent of η˜, i.e., E(Z˜|η) = E(Z˜)
for all η. This alternative specification captures a more intuitive idea that the output price,
P˜ , is directly, albeit imperfectly, influenced by the purchasing power index, Z, through the
deterministic function, B(Z). Indeed, it is easily verified that these two different specifi-
cations give rise to observationally equivalent results within the context of Adam-Mu¨ller
(2002).
Suppose that P˜ = B(Z˜) + η˜. We can write Eq. (6) as
ED(P˜ |Z) =
∫ Z
Z
B(z) dG(z)−
∫ Z
Z
B(z)
G(Z)
dG(z), (8)
for all Z ∈ [Z, Z], since Z˜ is conditionally independent of η˜. Differentiating Eq. (8) with
respect to Z yields
∂ED(P˜ |Z)
∂Z
=
G′(Z)
G(Z)2
∫ Z
Z
[B(z)−B(Z)] dG(z). (9)
Define the following function:
Φ(Z) =
∫ Z
Z
[B(z)−B(Z)] dG(z). (10)
Differentiating Eq. (10) with respect to Z, we have Φ′(Z) = −B′(Z)G(Z). Consider first
the case that B′(Z) < 0 so that Φ′(Z) > 0. Since Φ(Z) = 0, it follows that Φ(Z) > 0 and
the left-hand side of Eq. (9) is positive for all Z ∈ (Z, Z]. Since ED(P˜ |Z) = 0, it follows
that ED(P˜ |Z) < 0 for all Z ∈ [Z, Z). Hence, the alternative specification along the lines of
Adam-Mu¨ller (2002) implies that P˜ is negatively expectation dependent on Z˜.
6We now consider the case that B(Z) is U-shaped such that B(Z) ≤ E[B(Z˜)]. It follows
from Φ′(Z) = −B′(Z)G(Z) that Φ(Z) has an inverted U-shape. Since B(Z) ≤ E[B(Z˜)],
we have Φ(Z) ≥ 0 from Eq. (10). Given that Φ(Z), it must be true that Φ(Z) > 0 and
the left-hand side of Eq. (9) is positive for all Z ∈ (Z, Z). Since ED(P˜ |Z) = 0, it follows
that ED(P˜ |Z) < 0 for all Z ∈ [Z, Z). Although P˜ and Z˜ do not follow the alternative
specification along the lines of Adam-Mu¨ller (2002), P˜ is negatively expectation dependent
on Z˜ . In light of this, expectation dependence provides a more general dependence structure
than the one used by Adam-Mu¨ller (2002). We as such focus hereafter on the case that P˜
and Z˜ are negatively expectation dependent.4
4 Optimal hedging decision
In this section, we characterize the firm’s optimal forward position, X∗. To this end, we
use the covariance operator, Cov(·, ·), with respect to H(P, Z) to write Eq. (4) as5
Cov[U ′(Π˜∗)Z˜, P˜ ] = 0, (11)
since P f = E(P˜ ). Differentiating E[U(Π˜)] with respect to X and evaluating the resulting
derivative at Q = Q∗ and X = Q∗ yields
∂E[U(Π˜)]
∂X
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q∗,X=Q∗
= −Cov{U ′[Π(Z˜)]Z˜, P˜}, (12)
where Π(Z˜) = Z˜[W +E(P˜ )Q∗−C(Q∗)]. If the right-hand side of Eq. (12) is positive (neg-
ative), it follows immediately from Eq. (11) and the second-order conditions for program
(2) that X∗ > (<) Q∗.
Cuadras (2002) proves that Cov[α(P˜ ), β(Z˜)] can be written in terms of the CDFs, F (P ),
G(Z), and H(P, Z), as follows:
Cov[α(P˜ ), β(Z˜)] =
∫ P
P
∫ Z
Z
[H(P, Z)− F (P )G(Z)] dα(P ) dβ(Z), (13)
4The less likely case wherein P˜ and Z˜ are positively expectation dependent can be analogously analyzed.
5For any two random variables, X˜ and Y˜ , it is true that Cov(X˜, Y˜ ) = E(X˜Y˜ ) − E(X˜)E(Y˜ ).
7where α(·) and β(·) are functions of bounded variation. Using Eq. (13) with α(P˜ ) = P˜ and
β(Z˜) = U ′[Π(Z˜)]Z˜, we can write the right-hand side of Eq. (12) as
−
∫ P
P
∫ Z
Z
[H(P, Z)− F (P )G(Z)]{U ′[Π(Z)] + U ′′[Π(Z)]Π(Z)} dP dZ
= −
∫ Z
Z
ED(P˜ |Z){1− R[Π(Z)]}U ′[Π(Z)]G(Z) dZ, (14)
where ED(P˜ |Z) is defined in Eq. (6), and R(Π) = −ΠU ′′(Π)/U ′(Π) for all Π > 0 is the
Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion. Since P˜ is negatively expectation dependent
on Z˜ , we have ED(P˜ |Z) ≤ 0 for all Z ∈ [Z, Z]. The right-hand side of Eq. (14) is positive
(negative) if R(Π) ≤ (≥) 1 for all Π > 0, thereby invoking the following proposition.6
Proposition 1 Given that the price risk, P˜ , is negatively expectation dependent on the
inflation risk, Z˜, the competitive firm that can sell its output forward at the unbiased forward
price, P f = E(P˜ ), optimally opts for an over-hedge (under-hedge), i.e., X∗ > (<) Q∗, if
the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion, R(Π) = −ΠU ′′(Π)/U ′(Π), is everywhere
no greater (no smaller) than unity.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. Eq. (11) implies that the optimal forward
position, X∗, is the one that makes the multiple of the firm’s marginal utility, U ′(Π˜∗),
and the inflation risk, Z˜, invariant to the price risk, P˜ . Since P˜ and Z˜ are negatively
correlated in the sense of expectation dependence, they are natural hedges against each
other. Starting with a full-hedge, the firm has a cross-hedging incentive that reduces the
firm’s forward position. To see this, we write Eq. (1) with P f = E(P˜ ) as
Π˜ = Z˜{W + E(P˜ )Q− C(Q) + [P˜ − E(P˜ )](Q−X)}, (15)
It is evident from Eq. (15) that an over-hedge decreases (increases) the firm’s nominal
income at date 1 as P increases (decreases), which is more likely when Z is lower (higher).
6If R(Π) = 1 for all Π > 0, i.e, the firm has a logarithmic utility function, the firm’s optimal forward
position is a full-hedge, i.e., X∗ = Q∗.
8Given risk aversion, the over-hedge is more effective in reducing the variability of U ′(Π˜∗)Z˜.
Since the elasticity of the firm’s marginal utility is gauged by the Arrow-Pratt measure of
relative risk aversion, R(Π) = −ΠU ′′(Π)/U ′(Π), the firm’s marginal utility is insensitive
(sensitive) to the price risk if R(Π) is small (large). The cross-hedging incentive is therefore
stronger (weaker) if R(Π) is small (large). Taking expectations on both sides of Eq. (15)
yields
E(Π˜) =W +E(P˜ )Q− C(Q) + Cov(P˜ , Z˜)(Q−X). (16)
As is evident from the last term on the right-hand side of Eq. (16), an over-hedge in-
creases the firm’s expected real income at date 1 since Cov(P˜ , Z˜) < 0. This gives rise
to a speculative incentive that induces the firm to opt for an over-hedge. This speculative
incentive is stronger (weaker) if the firm is less (more) risk averse, which dominates (is dom-
inated by) the cross-hedging incentive, thereby rendering the optimality of an over-hedge
(under-hedge), if R(Π) ≤ (≥) 1 for all Π > 0.
5 Optimal production decision
In this section, we examine the firm’s optimal production decision. Substituting Eq. (4)
with P f = E(P˜ ) into Eq. (3) yields C′(Q∗) = E(P˜ ), which implies that the separation
theorem holds under the joint price and inflation risk. If the firm cannot hedge against the
price risk, i.e., X ≡ 0, the first-order condition for program (2) becomes
E
{
U ′{Z˜[W + P˜Q◦ −C(Q◦)]}Z˜[P˜ −C′(Q◦)]
}
= 0, (17)
where Q◦ is the optimal output level when forward trading is not allowed. Differentiating
E[U(Π˜)] with respect to Q and evaluating the resulting derivative at Q = Q∗ and X = 0
yields
∂E[U(Π˜)]
∂Q
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q∗,X=0
= E
{
U ′{Z˜[W + P˜Q∗ −C(Q∗)]}Z˜[P˜ − E(P˜ )]
}
, (18)
since C′(Q∗) = E(P˜ ). If the right-hand side of Eq. (18) is negative (positive), it follows
immediately from Eq. (17) and the second-order conditions for program (2) that Q◦ < (>
9) Q∗.
Differentiating E[U(Π˜)] with respect to X and evaluating the resulting derivative at
Q = Q∗ and X = 0 yields
∂E[U(Π˜)]
∂X
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q∗,X=0
= E
{
U ′{Z˜[W + P˜Q∗ −C(Q∗)]}Z˜[E(P˜ )− P˜ ]
}
. (19)
If X∗ > (<) 0, it follows from Eq. (4) and the second-order conditions for program (2) that
the right-hand side of Eq. (19) is positive (negative). Eqs. (18) and (19) then imply that
Q◦ < (>) Q∗ if X∗ > (<) 0, thereby invoking the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If the competitive firm optimally sells (purchases) its output forward, i.e.,
X∗ > (<) 0, at the unbiased forward price, P f = E(P˜ ), under the joint price and inflation
risk, banning the firm from forward trading induces the firm to lower (raise) its optimal
output level, i.e., Q◦ < (>) Q∗.
From Proposition 1, X∗ > Q∗ if R(Π) ≤ 1 for all Π > 0. In this case, Q◦ < Q∗ since
X∗ > 0. On the other hand, X∗ < Q∗ if R(Π) ≥ 1 for all Π > 0. In this case, X∗ can be
positive or negative, and thus Q◦ can be smaller or greater than Q∗, respectively. These
results are consistent with those of Adam-Mu¨ller (2002).
To see the intuition for Proposition 2, we recast Eq. (17) as
C′(Q◦) = E(P˜ ) +
Cov
{
U ′{Z˜[W + P˜Q◦ − C(Q◦)]}Z˜, P˜
}
E
{
U ′{Z˜[W + P˜Q◦ − C(Q◦)]}Z˜
} . (20)
Eq. (20) states that the firm’s optimal output level, Q◦, is the one that equates the marginal
cost of production, C′(Q◦), to the certainty equivalent output price that takes the inflation
risk and the firm’s preferences into account. Indeed, the second term on the right-hand side
of Eq. (20) captures the price risk premium, which must be positive (negative) if the firm
optimally sells (purchases) its output forward, i.e., X∗ > (<) 0, at the unbiased forward
price, P f = E(P˜ ), thereby implying that Q◦ < (>) Q∗.
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In the absence of the inflation risk, i.e., Z˜ ≡ 1, the price risk premium is unambiguously
negative since U ′′(Π) < 0. In this case, X∗ > 0 and thus Q◦ < Q∗, which is the well-known
result of Holthausen (1979). When the inflation risk prevails, the price risk premium can
be positive or negative. Since the elasticity of the firm’s marginal utility is gauged by the
Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion,R(Π) = −ΠU ′′(Π)/U ′(Π), the firm’s marginal
utility is insensitive to the price risk if R(Π) is small. In this case, the price risk premium
is mainly driven by the covariance between P˜ and Z˜, which is negative. Hence, the firm
optimally produces less if R(Π) ≤ 1 for all Π > 0. To see that the price risk premium can be
positive if R(Π) is large, consider the case that Z˜ = 1/P˜ . The firm’s real income at date 1 is
then given by Q◦+ [W −C(Q◦)]/P , which decreases (increases) as P increases (decreases).
Given risk aversion, the firm’s marginal utility is positively correlated with the price risk.
The multiple of the firm’s marginal utility and the inflation risk is also positively correlated
with the price risk if R(Π) ≥ 1 + A(Π)Q◦ for all Π > 0, where A(Π) = −U ′′(Π)/U ′(Π) is
the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. This gives rise to a positive price risk
premium so that the firm optimally produces more when forward trading is banned.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the behavior of a competitive firm facing joint inflation and price
risk. When the price risk is negatively correlated with the inflation risk in the sense of
expectation dependence, we show that the firm optimally opts for an over-hedge (under-
hedge) if the firm’s coefficient of relative risk aversion is everywhere no greater (no smaller)
than unity. We show further that banning the firm from forward trading may induce the
firm to produce more or less, depending on whether the price risk premium is positive
or negative, respectively. While the price risk premium is unambiguously negative in the
absence of the inflation risk, it is not the case when the inflation risk prevails. In contrast
to the conventional wisdom, forward hedging needs not always promote production should
firms take inflation seriously.
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